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FEDERAL INCOME TA-SALE OR EXCHANGE OF PARTNERSHIP INTER-
EST-CAPITAL Loss-CoRN PRODUCTS-The United States Tax Court
has held that section 741 of the Internal Revenue Code controls the
characterization of the loss from the sale or exchange of a partner-
ship interest; that section acts independently of section 1221, and
therefore the taxpayer may not avail himself of the Corn Products
doctrine.
Pollack v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 142 (1977).
Petitioner,I H. Clinton Pollack, Jr., was employed as a group vice-
president of a large New York City consulting firm. As a manage-
ment consultant, his duties primarily consisted of providing advice
in the areas of marketing, business communications and the struc-
turing or restructuring of businesses. Although employed full time,
he sought outside employment in areas not affiliated with that of
his principal employment. This was an accepted practice for con-
sultants, 2 provided that no conflict of interest arose between the
employee's work and the outside work.
In 1968, Pollack invested in Millworth Associates, a limited part-
nership, which would purchase declining businesses with the hope
of remedying their problems and developing the businesses into
successful enterprises. The businesses acquired by Millworth would
require the services of various professionals, such as attorneys, ac-
countants and consultants. Pollack was under the impression,
gained through discussions with the designated general partner,
that these specialized services would be referred to the qualified
limited partners. 3
Pollack had been involved in the development of several ventures
controlled by Millworth, but approximately one year after his initial
investment, he felt the emphasis of Millworth was shifting to that
of an investment company. Furthermore, the desired consulting
1. Technically, H. Clinton Pollack, Jr., and his wife, Wendy Pollack, were the petitioners
in this action since they had filed joint federal income tax returns for the years in question,
1969 and 1966. Since this suit involves actions taken only by H. Clinton Pollack, Jr., he will
be hereinafter referred to as petitioner or Pollack. Pollack, although not an attorney, argued
the case pro se.
2. Pollack v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 142, 143 (1977).
3. Other investors undoubtedly had the same impression, since a number of Millworth's
limited partners were such professionals. Id. at 142-43.
Pollack borrowed $50,000 to become a limited partner in Millworth Associates. His propor-
tionate share of the profits and losses was approximately 6.5%. Brief for Respondent at 4.
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business which Millworth was supposed to generate never material-
ized. Having entered the partnership solely for the purpose of secur-
ing a new source of consulting business,4 Pollack decided to with-
draw from Millworth.5 His interest was liquidated' at a loss7 which
was claimed as a business loss,' or alternatively, as an ordinary and
necessary business expense,' on his federal income tax return for
1969.10 Respondent, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, disallowed
the deduction and petitioner brought this action for a redetermina-
tion of the resulting deficiency."
The controversy before the tax court did not center upon the
question of whether the loss was deductible, but rather focused upon
the characterization of the loss. The Commissioner contended that
section 741 controlled and mandated that the loss be characterized
4. 69 T.C. at 144. This finding of fact would have become crucial if the court had held
the Corn Products doctrine applicable. See note 37 infra. In a recent opinion, W. W. Windle
Co. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 694 (1976), appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d 43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 966 (1977), the tax court held that a substantial investment motive will preclude the
application of the Corn Products doctrine, even where there is a primary business motive for
acquiring the asset. See also LeMaster, Corporate Securities Losses: Is Corn Products Now
Irrelevant? 3 J. CoRp. TAX 141 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LeMaster]; Note, Investment
Motive Precludes Ordinary Loss Treatment, 30 U. MIAI1 L. REv. 760 (1976). If Pollack had
held Corn Products applicable to section 741, this finding of fact would have precluded any
argument by the Commissioner that there was a substantial investment motive.
5. 69 T.C. at 144. Petitioner's decision to withdraw from Millworth was made in Septem-
ber, 1969, although his interest was actually liquidated at year's end as provided in the
partnership agreement. Brief for Respondent at 8.
6. Pollack completely terminated his interest which was a "liquidation of a partners
interest." I.R.C. § 761(d). The payments received in liquidation of a partner's interest, to the
extent that they are determined to be made in exchange for such partner's interest in partner-
ship property, are considered a distribution by the partnership. I.R.C. § 736(b)(1). Since they
were made in cash the loss was recognized under I.R.C. § 731(a)(2), with the character of such
loss within the ambit of I.R.C. § 741. 69 T.C. at 144 n.1.
7. The loss incurred by petitioner as a result of liquidating his interest amounted to
$27,069. 69 T.C. at 144.
8. I.R.C. § 165(a), (c). An individual's business loss may be fully deducted from gross
income. I.R.C. § 62(1).
9. I.R.C. § 162(a). Ordinary and necessary business expenses are also fully deductible
from gross income. I.R.C. § 62(1).
10. An application for a tentative refund from the carryback of a net operating loss for
the year 1966 was also filed. I.R.C. § 172. Section 172 provides in relevant part that if
deductions are greater than gross income for any taxable year, such excess, or "net operating
loss", may be carried back to prior years, deducted from that year's taxable income, and a
refund claimed. Id.
11. The disallowance of the deduction resulted in a deficiency for 1969 of $1,433.98, while
the denial of the net operating loss carryback to 1966 resulted in a $2,593.03 deficiency in
that year. 69 T.C. at 142.
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as the "loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset."'" Pollack
maintained, however, that his interest in Millworth Associates
failed to qualify as a capital asset in his hands. To support his
contention, petitioner relied upon the Corn Products'3 exception to
section 1221.4
A majority of the tax court agreed with the Commissioner that
section 741 was dispositive of the characterization of the loss. Judge
Fay, 5 expressing the view of the majority, concluded that the legis-
lative history and the plain language of the statute commanded that
petitioner's loss be regarded as a capital loss. The court's analysis
of the legislative history revealed that the tax treatment of partners
and partnerships had been confusing and contradictory prior to the
enactment of Subchapter K of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.'
12. I.R.C. § 741 reads in full:
In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership, gain or loss shall be
recognized to the transferor partner. Such gain or loss shall be considered as gain or
loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset, except as otherwise provided in section
751 (relating to unrealized receivables and inventory items which have appreciated
substantially in value).
13. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Comm'r, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). Corn Products was a
nationally known manufacturer of products made from grain corn. Its storage facilities were
inadequate for its production requirements of raw corn for any extended period. To.protect
itself from a price rise and short supply, Corn Products purchased "corn futures." In 1940,
the futures were sold at a gain, and in similar transactions in 1942 they were sold at a loss.
The Supreme Court found the futures to be an integral part of the business. Id. at 50. The
Court held that although corn futures are not literally within the exceptions to the predecessor
of section 1221, congressional purpose mandated that the gains and losses arising from the
sale or exchange of corn futures be treated as ordinary income or loss.
Admittedly, petitioner's corn futures do not come within the literal language of the
exclusions set out in that section .... But the capital asset provision of section 117
[of the 1939 Code, now embodied in I.R.C. § 12211 must not be so broadly applied as
to defeat rather than further the purpose of Congress .... Congress intended that
profits and losses arising from the everyday operation of a business be considered as
ordinary income or loss rather than capital gain or loss.
Id. at 51-52. See generally Cunnane, Acquiring Capital Items for Non-capital Purposes, or
When is a Capital Asset Not a Capital Asset?, 29 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. ON FED. TAx 705 (1971);
Kauffman, A Second Look At the Corn Products Doctrine, 41 TAXEs 605 (1963).
14. I.R.C. § 1221 defines a "capital asset" as "property" other than certain enumerated
exceptions. See Comment, Non-Statutory Definition of Capital Assets: The Further Judicial
Erosion Of The Term "Property" In The Internal Revenue Code, 24 SYRAcusE L. Rav. 1189
(1973).
15. Judge Fay was also the trial judge. The trial was held on October 20, 1975, and the
evidence consisted of a stipulation of facts with exhibits attached and some oral testimony.
Brief for Respondent at 1-2.
16. 69 T.C. at 145-46. H.R. REP. No. 1337, to accompany H.R. 8300 (Pub. L. No. 591),
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 65, reprinted in [19541 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4025, 4091. See
also Rabkin and Johnson, The Partnership Under the Federal Tax Laws, 55 HARv. L. Rv.
909 (1942).
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Much of the confusion that had existed under the 1939 Code
resulted from a dichotomy in views concerning the treatment to be
afforded partners and partnerships." The Pollack court explained
that the government had initially espoused the aggregate theory of
partnership taxation.18 Under this concept, the sale of a partnership
interest was treated as a sale of the individual partner's undivided
interest in each of the partnership assets. Accordingly, the amount
and character of the resulting gain or loss was determined by refer-
ence to the individual assets of the partnership. The court noted,
however, that the courts had consistently adopted the entity ap-
proach. 9 This theory characterized the partnership interest as a
capital asset in and of itself. By 1950, the government conceded and
adopted the position that the sale of a partnership interest is the
sale of a capital asset. 0 Pollack recognized that this capital asset
treatment was a prelude to the conversion of ordinary income into
capital gain through the use of a "collapsible partnership."21 From
this analysis, the court concluded that section 741 was enacted as a
part of Subchapter .K of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code to elimi-
nate, through the codification of G.C.M. 26379,22 much of the exist-
17. For an explanation of the aggregate and entity theories and the manner in which the
1954 Code blended features from both concepts, see generally McKEE, NELSON & WHITMORE,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNMERSMPS AND PARTNERS 1.02 (1977).
18. 69 T.C. at 146. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Lehman, 165 F.2d 383 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 819 (1948), where the Commissioner unsuccessfully contended that the partner's holding
period in each firm asset should begin with the date when the partnership acquired that asset.
The Government also unsuccessfully argued that when a partner dies, the partnership dis-
solves, and if the business is continued the holding period is recycled and begins to run anew.
The Second Circuit countered both these positions by applying the entity theory of partner-
ship taxation. Id. at 386.
19. 69 T.C. at 146. See Swiren v. Comm'r, 183 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 912 (1951), holding that the gain recognized on the sale of a partner's interest in a law
firm was capital gain. The partner had assigned his entire interest, except for one fee. The
Commissioner attempted to segregate partnership accounts receivable and unbilled fees for
work in progress and arbitrarily label both as past earnings. Id. at 660. The partnership
interest, however, was held to be a capital asset as a whole.
20. G.C.M. 26379, 1950-1 C.B. 58, declared obsolete, Rev. Rul. 67-406, 1967-2 C.B. 420,
425, in accordance with Rev. Proc. 67-6, 1967-1 C.B. 576. G.C.M. 26379 was declared obsolete
because the statements contained therein were superseded by the enactment of the 1954
Code. It is still a very important and relevant part of the legislative history of Subchapter
K.
21. For an explanation of "collapsible partnerships", see Jackson, Johnson, Surrey, Tenen
and Warren, The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Partnerships, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 1183, 1216
(1954). If a partnership possessed appreciated inventory or unrealized receivables a partner
could sell his interest and recognize capital gain. The purchaser could then withdraw from
the partnership, taking the ordinary assets at a basis equal to his cost for the partnership
interest. Id.
22. 1950-1 C.B. 58, note 20 supra.
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ing confusion in the area, as well as, to eliminate the availability of
the "collapsible partnership" as a tax avoidance device.23 If such
was the dual purpose behind section 741, the court reasoned that
Congress intended it to act independently of section 1221.4 There-
fore, since Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner25 had been
decided under section 1221, the doctrine expressed in that case was
not applicable to the section 741 situation presented in Pollack.2"
The court was also influenced by the plain language of the stat-
ute. The use of the phrase "shall . . . be considered as" embodied
in section 741 was believed to unambiguously mandate capital
treatment. This phrase, used also in sections 731, 735, 736 and 751,
had been consistently interpreted by the regulations" as unequivo-
cally demanding a certain result. By using such language, Congress
had meant to forestall any deviations from the statutory directions.
Moreover, if Congress had intended the definition of a capital asset
provided by section 1221 to apply to section 741, it would have either
expressly or impliedly indicated such an intent.2
Judge Tannenwald dissented in an opinion joined by Judge Simp-
son.2 The dissenters found the court's reliance upon the legislative
history and language of section 741 neither compelling nor convinc-
23. 69 T.C. at 146.
24. Id. at 147.
25. 350 U.S. 46 (1955). See note 13 supra.
26. This conclusion was expressed in a corresponding footnote, and explains why the court
felt it was unnecessary to consider petitioner's Corn Products argument. 69 T.C. at 147 n.7.
27. I.R.C. § 731 is similar to section 741, in that the gain or loss recognized on a distribu-
tion by the partnership to a partner shall be considered as a gain or loss from the sale or
exchange of the partnership interest of the distributee partner. Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(a)(3)
repeats this directive with no further elaboration. I.R.C. § 735 provides that gain or loss on
the receivables shall be considered as ordinary income or loss. The rule is repeated in Treas.
Reg. § 1.735-1(a). I.R.C. § 736 states that payments made in liquidation of the interest of a
retiring or deceased partner shall be considered as a distributive share of partnership income
or a guaranteed payment described in section 707(c). Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(4) gives no
indication that there is to be any deviation from the statutory language. I.R.C. § 751(a)
requires that the amount realized in exchange for a partnership interest attributable to
unrealized receivables or substantially appreciated inventory items shall be considered as
arising from the sale or exchange of property other than a capital asset. The relevant regula-
tion, Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(a)(1), likewise repeats the statutory language almost verbatim.
28. 69 T.C. at 147. I.R.C. §§ 302, 331, 1232 and 1233 were cited as examples in support of
this proposition. The latter two sections expressly incorporate the definition of a capital asset.
I.R.C. § 302 states distributions in redemption of stock shall be treated as a distribution in
part or full payment in exchange for the stock. Employing similar language, I.R.C. § 331
treats amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a corporation as full payment in ex-
change for the stock.
29. 69 T.C. at 147 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
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ing. They agreed with the majority that when section 741 was en-
acted in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, Congress intended to cod-
ify the then existing law as expressed in G.C.M. 26379.30 Judge
Tannenwald refused, however, to extend this analysis one step fur-
ther, as the majority had done in concluding that section 741 was
intended to act completely independent of section 1221. Rather, he
maintained that section 741 merely codified the then existing treat-
ment of a partnership as a capital asset in accordance with the
principles of section 117 of the 1939 Code.31 Thus, he believed that
section 741 should not bar ordinary income or loss treatment in
situations that are inconsistent with the basic concept of a capital
asset.
32
Moreover, the dissent was not persuaded by the majority's argu-
ment that the plain language of section 741 controlled to make
petitioner's loss a capital loss. Judge Tannenwald rebutted the ma-
jority's logic by pointing out that the tax court had, when faced with
specific statutory language in other Code sections, often held that
general principles of tax law override the plain statutory language.
The dissenters were not prepared to say the Corn Products doctrine
has the same pervasive applicability as such general tax principles
as the tax benefit rule,33 which had previously been held to demand
a result contrary to explicit statutory directions. They nonetheless
believed that a useful analogy existed between the instant contro-
versy and those cases which utilized the tax benefit rule to sustain
a finding of taxable income, despite the applicability of a nonrecog-
nition section.34 Thus, the dissent concluded the majority was wrong
in absolutely refusing to apply the Corn Products doctrine.3 5
30. 1950-1 C.B. 58. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
31. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 289, § 117, 52 Stat. 500 (1938), the relevant portion of which
is now embodied in I.R.C. § 1221.
32. 69 T.C. at 148.
33. The tax benefit rule provides that an item properly offset against gross income in
determining one year's tax liability is includible in gross income when it is recovered in a
subsequent year. Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 401-02 (Ct. Cl.
1967). This rule has frequently operated to cause the taxation of income despite the otherwise
applicability of a nonrecognition section. See generally O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of
Income and the Overriding Principle of the Tax Benefit Rule in the Taxation of Corporations
and Shareholders, 27 TAx L. Rxv. 215 (1972).
34. 69 T.C. at 149. The dissent supported this proposition by citing Tennessee Carolina
Transportation, Inc. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 440 (1975), aff'd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978), and
Estate of M.unter v. Comm'r, 63 T.C. 663 (1975). For a further discussion of these cases, see
notes 54-58 and accompanying text, infra.
35. 69 T.C. at 148.
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The minority also addressed a facet of the case which the majority
had not discussed. Judge Tannenwald recognized an analogy be-
tween Pollack's investment in a limited partnership and cases
which have applied the Corn Products doctrine to investments in
corporate securities. 6 It was noted that the tax court had recently
completed an exhaustive analysis of the scope of Corn Products in
the corporate securities cases in W. W. Windle Co. v.
Commissioner. 31 Acknowledging that Corn Products was ultimately
held to be inapplicable in Windle, it was believed the precedents
examined there were sufficiently related to the present case to war-
rant perusal. With respect to the application of Corn Products, the
dissent was unable to perceive any distinction between the present
situation and a hypothetical purchase of shares in a corporation
under circumstances similar to those which induced Pollack to in-
vest in this limited partnership. The majority would apply Corn
Products in the former situation but not in the latter. Cautiously
noting that Windle had expressly recognized a limit to the scope of
the Corn Products doctrine, 38 the dissenters still believed that even
the existence of such limitations did not warrant the majority's
absolute refusal to apply the doctrine.39
Pollack presented the tax court with an opportunity to resolve the
conflict between section 741 and the Corn Products doctrine. The
Code recites the general rule that gain or loss from the sale or ex-
change of a partnership interest is to be treated as capital gain or
36. Id. at 148-49.
37. 65 T.C. 694 (1976), appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d 42 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
996 (1977). In W. W. Windle Co. v. Comm'r, a corporation purchased shares'of stock in Nor-
West, Inc. in order to assure a supply of raw wool which was necessary for its manufacturing
process. The tax court found the predominant motive in acquiring the stock to be the acquisi-
tion of a captive customer. Ordinarily, this would invoke the Corn Products doctrine, causing
any gain or loss on the subsequent sale or exchange of the stock to be ordinary. But there
was also a secondary and substantial investment motive, and since the stock was sold at a
loss, the Commissioner argued that this rendered Corn Products inapplicable. The tax court
agreed, holding that in dual-purpose situations where there is a substantial investment mo-
tive, the requirements of the Corn Products doctrine are not satisfied. The loss involved in
Windle was, therefore, a capital loss.
38. 69 T.C. at 149. Windle takes cognizance of the fact that Corn Products was a nonstatu-
tory exception to section 1221 and there are limits to the liberties that can be taken with
statutory language. The corn futures held to be ordinary assets in Corn Products were closely
related to inventory items, which are specifically excluded from the definition of a capital
asset. I.R.C. § 1221(1). The Windle court felt that the more removed the property was from
an exception in section 1221, and the closer it was to the "more traditional form of capital
asset," the more carefully Corn Products must be applied. 65 T.C. at 713.
39. 69 T.C. at 149.
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loss.4 0 Under the Corn Products doctrine,"' however, the motive be-
hind the acquisition of an asset is determinative of its character. If
an asset is acquired for business purposes, in contrast with an in-
vestment intent, any gain or loss on the subsequent sale or exchange
of the asset will be ordinary in character." Pollack's unique factual
pattern was the first reported decision to bring these competing
interests into focus. 43 The taxpayer presented a prima facie case for
the application of Corn Products." The tax court held, however,
that section 741 was dispositive of the characterization issue." In
concluding that the legislative history and plain language of the
statute commanded that the petitioner's loss be regarded as a capi-
tal loss, the majority failed to examine several important considera-
tions.
The tax court's decision to construe Pollack's withdrawal as a
section 741 capital loss was based upon the explicit premise that
section 741 acts independently of section 1221."1 Because the major-
ity perceived the language of section 741 to be plain, unambiguous
and mandatory, they concluded that it was the sole applicable sec-
tion. Apparently taking an inflexible, mechanical approach, the
majority unconvincingly failed to consider whether the Corn
Products doctrine even applied to a section 741 transaction. 7 Conse-
quently, the Pollack court overlooked the important principles
spawned by Corn Products.
In Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner," the Supreme
Court, analyzing the congressional purpose for providing preferen-
40. I.R.C. § 741.
41. See note 13 supra.
42. This doctrine is often phrased in terms of the integral part of the business test. Gain
or loss on the sale of an investment will be treated as ordinary income if the investment was
an integral part of the taxpayer's business. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
43. The problem posed by Pollack has rarely even been considered by the commentators.
Usually, I.R.C. § 741 is accepted at face value with very little elaboration. See, e.g., Swihart,
Tax Problems Raised by Liquidations of Partnership Interests, 44 Tax. L. Rav. 1209, 1212
(1966); Morris, Disposition of Partnership Interests: Achieving Capital-Gains Treatment, 25
TAx LAW. 473, 474 n.5 (1972). One of the only authorities to discuss the problem reached the
opposite conclusion of the tax court. See Note, The Uncertain Tax Definition of Partnerships:
Problems and Opportunities for Treatment of Terminal Losses, 54 MINN. L. REv. 805, 819-21
(1970). See also MERTENs, LAw oF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION, Code Commentary § 741-743:2,
93 n.1 (1975) (suggesting I.R.C. § 741 should not be taken literally in certain situations).
44. See notes 48-52 and accompanying text infra.
45. 69 T.C. at 145.
46. Id. at 147.
47. Id. at n.7.
48. 350 U.S. 46 (1955); see note 13 supra.
Vol. 17: 203
Recent Decisions
tial capital gain and loss treatment, held that the definition of a
capital asset must be narrowly applied and its exclusions broadly
interpreted." The rationale rested upon the basic congressional pur-
pose for providing a deviation from the normal, ordinary income
requirements of the Code. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
emphasized that capital gain and loss treatment was to apply to
transactions in property which are not the normal source of business
income.N Correspondingly, profits and losses arising from the every-
day operation of a business should be considered as ordinary income
or loss, rather than capital gain or loss. The same policies should
have warranted application of the Corn Products doctrine to the
factual situation in Pollack. The court specifically found that Pol-
lack entered Millworth Associates for the sole purpose of securing a
new source of potential consulting business." This is tantamount to
a finding that the loss occurred in the everyday operation of a busi-
ness.52 Consequently, had the tax court correctly considered the
policies underlying the Corn Products doctrine, the loss would have
been properly characterized as ordinary.
Although it was proper for the court to follow congressional in-
structions as expressed in the statutory language, the court's conclu-
sion that the language was mandatory on its face clearly disregarded
the fact that the court had ignored specific statutory language in the
past. On several prior occasions, the court had relied upon general
tax principles in order to subordinate specific statutory language. 53
For example, in Tennessee Carolina Transportation, Inc. v.
Commissionerm a corporation distributed items during liquidation
that had previously been expensed. The tax court concluded that
the tax benefit rule 5 required the inclusion in gross income of the
49. 350 U.S. at 52. In reaching this conclusion the Court invoked the judicial policy that
exceptions to the normal, ordinary income requirements of the Code must be narrowly inter-
preted.
50. Id.
51. 69 T.C. at 144. See also note 4 supra.
52. The Commissioner argued, however, that Pollack had failed to establish that he was
engaged in a trade or business independent of his status as an employee. Brief for Respondent
at 12.
53. See, e.g., Coast Coil Co. v. Comm'r, 50 T.C. 528, aff'd per curiam, 422 F.2d 402 (9th
Cir. 1970), where the court recognized that either an assignment of income or a clear reflection
of income theory might be utilized to require the recognition of gain or loss, despite the
applicability of a non-recognition provision, section 337. Id. at 534-35.
54. 65 T.C. 440 (1975), aff'd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978).
55. See note 33 supra.
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lesser of the fair market value of the items distributed or the portion
of their cost attributable to their useful life remaining at the time
of distribution." The court reached this result notwithstanding sec-
tion 336, which provides that a corporation shall not recognize gain
or loss on the distribution of property in partial or complete liquida-
tion. Similarly, in Estate of Munter v. Commissioner,57 the court
held the recovery of previously expensed items in a liquidating sale
was taxable under the tax benefit rule, even though the language of
section 33758 clearly mandated a contrary result. The court in
Pollack, however, inexplicably refused to acknowledge that it had
previously circumvented plain statutory language by applying gen-
eral tax doctrines.
Moreover, the court's reliance upon the regulations failed to sup-
port its conclusion. The phrase "shall be considered as," employed
in sections 741, 731, 735, 736 and 751 was viewed as unambiguous
and mandatory on its face. The court further believed the regula-
tions had consistently applied such an interpretation. An examina-
tion of the corresponding regulations, however, reveals that they
merely paraphrase the statutory language and add no further elabo-
ration germane to the issue under consideration."
The intent of Congress in enacting section 741 was correctly inter-
preted by the tax court as codifying the then existing law as ex-
pressed in G.C.M. 26379.60 This government release declared that
the sale or exchange of a partnership interest was to be treated as
the sale or exchange of a capital asset in accordance with section 117
of the 1939 Code.' The Pollack court relied upon this statement to
support its conclusion that when Congress enacted section 741 by
codifying G.C.M. 26379, it intended that section to act indepen-
dently of section 1221.62 Such a conclusion is extremely tenuous in
light of the reference by G.C.M. 26379 to section 117 of the 1939
Code, which was the predecessor to section 1221.63 Logic would indi-
56. 65 T.C. at 448.
57. 63 T.C. 663 (1975).
58. I.R.C. § 337(a) provides that no gain or loss will be recognized to the liquidating
corporation, if within twelve months after the corporation adopts a plan of complete liquida-
tion, all ,of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquidation.
59. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
60. 69 T.C. at 146-47.
61. G.C.M. 26379, 1950-1 C.B. 58.
62. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
63. Under the 1939 Code, section 117 contained most of the rules for preferential capital
gain and loss treatment. The current section 1221 was derived from Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
Vol. 17: 203
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cate that the tax court should have drawn the opposite conclusion.
The majority found either express or implied references to section
1221 in sections 302, 331, 1232 and 1235.11 Yet, where the legislative
history behind section 741 more clearly indicated a reference to
section 1221, the tax court failed to recognize it.
Finally, the tax court's plain language approach enabled it to
circumvent an examination of the plethora of cases which had ap-
plied Corn Products to the analogous situation involving the sale or
exchange of corporate securities. 5 An analysis of the taxpayer's situ-
ation in Pollack reveals that his status paralleled the status of a
corporate shareholder." Pollack's interest was freely alienable, it
did not entitle him to partake in the management affairs of the
partnership, and he was liable only to the extent of his investment.
Furthermore, Corn Products had been litigated in cases where tax-
payers had purchased stock for business purposes similar to those
which induced Pollack to invest in Millworth Associates.67 The fail-
ure to consider such relevant authorities is indicative of the tax
court's incomplete and superficial resolution of the problem posed
by Pollack.
ch. 289, § 117(a), 52 Stat. 500. The tax court's conclusion is further weakened in light of the
fact that Corn Products Refining Co. v. Comm'r, 350 U.S. 46 (1955), was decided under
section 117 of the 1939 Code.
64. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
65. See generally Javarass, Corporate Capital Gains and Losses-The Corn Products
Doctrine, 52 TAXES 770 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Javarass].66. The basis for Pollack's reliance upon the Corn Products corporate securities cases was
Booth Newspaper, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962). The Commissioner
agreed that if it was necessary to look beyond Subchapter K, the rule as enunciated in Booth
should control. Reply Brief for Respondent at 9. The often quoted interpretation of Corn
Products enunciated in Booth reads as follows:
[I]f securities are purchased by a taxpayer as an integral and necessary act in the
conduct of his business, and continue to be so held until the time of their sale, any
loss incurred as a result thereof may be fully deducted from gross income as a business
expense or ordinary loss. If, on the other hand, an investment purpose be found to have
motivated the purchase or holding of the securities, any loss realized upon their ulti-
mate disposition must be treated in accord with the capital asset provisions of the
Code.
303 F.2d at 921.
The facts in Pollack and Booth were similar in that both taxpayers made investments to
hedge against an interruption in their business cycles. Pollack invested in Millworth to obtain
captive customers for his services or a market for his finished product. However, in Booth,
the taxpayer, a newspaper publisher, purchased 45% of the stock of a paper mill to secure a
source of raw materials. For an excellent analysis of analogous captive market cases, see
Javarass, supra, note 65, at 778-81.
67. For one of the best studies of the similar cases applying Corn Products to the corporate
securities area, see Javarass, supra note 65, at 778-789.
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Although the result in Pollack is consistent with the tax court's
noticeable trend of curtailing the utility of Corn Products to taxpay-
ers who have sustained losses," the court's analysis casts considera-
ble doubt upon the propriety of this trend. 9 The reasoning em-
ployed in Pollack is clearly not unassailable. The effect of the deci-
sion is to limit Corn Products in a manner unwarranted by the
Supreme Court's original promulgation of that doctrine. Courts con-
fronted with this issue in the future should analyze not only the
legislative history and plain language of the statute, but also all
salient and important considerations.
William E. Kelleher, Jr.
68. This is the criticism aimed at the tax court in response to its recent decision, W. W.
Windle v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 694 (1976), appeal dismissed, 500 F.2d 43 (lst Cir.), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 966 (1977). See note 4 infra. One author concludes that Windle has curtailed the
usefulness of the Corn Products doctrine in the corporate securities area, at least to taxpayers
who have sustained losses. LeMaster, supra, note 4, at 161. But see Note, Investment Motive
Precludes Ordinary Loss Treatment, 30 U. Mun L. REv. 760 (1976), which interprets the
effect of Windle as less devastating to taxpayers. The ease with which an investment motive
may be found precludes the usefulness of Corn Products to taxpayers in loss situations, but
may open Pandora's box as far as claiming capital gain treatment. This view is supported
by Bell Fibre Products Corp. v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. 182 (1977), appeal docketed (7th Cir.
Sept. 9, 1977). The facts in Bell Fibre were similar to Windle, except the stock was sold at a
gain. The tax court held that a substantial investment motive precluded the government from
arguing that Corn Products made the gain ordinary income.
69. Pollack lends credence to the attacks levied against the tax court's recent interpreta-
tion of Corn Products, note 68 supra. Perhaps, the court would have concluded section 741
was not overriden by Corn Products if it had specifically considered that issue. The scope of
Corn Products has never been definitively established, and will continue to be litigated for
some time. The few authorities who have considered this problem, however, correctly deter-
mined that section 741 should be subject to the Corn Products doctrine. See note 43 supra.
The failure to directly confront this issue is the fatal flaw of Pollack.
